The Supreme Court Law
Review: Osgoode’s Annual
Constitutional Cases
Conference
Volume 47 (2009)

Article 3

Sniffing Out the Ancillary Powers Implications of
the Dog Sniff Cases
James Stribopoulos
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works
4.0 License.
Citation Information
Stribopoulos, James. "Sniffing Out the Ancillary Powers Implications of the Dog Sniff Cases." The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s
Annual Constitutional Cases Conference 47. (2009).
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr/vol47/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Supreme
Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.

Sniffing Out the Ancillary Powers
‡
Implications of the Dog Sniff Cases
James Stribopoulos*

I. INTRODUCTION
Last spring the Supreme Court of Canada released judgments in a
pair of cases involving the use of drug-sniffing dogs by police: R. v.
Kang-Brown1 and R. v. M. (A.).2 These decisions received considerable
media attention, mostly for what they had to say about the constitutionality
of the police employing drug-sniffing dogs.3 Lost in the media coverage,
which was confused by the sheer length of the Court‟s opinions and the
fact that the justices issued four separate sets of reasons in each case, was
a larger controversy regarding the Court‟s continued use of the “ancillary
powers doctrine” as a means of creating new common law police powers.
The ancillary powers doctrine allows for the recognition of police
powers by deploying what is essentially a cost-benefit analysis. This lawmaking device has two parts. First, it begins with a query as to whether
the impugned actions of a police officer fall within the scope of his or her
broad duties.4 Assuming the answer is “yes”,5 the second step involves a
weighing of the apparent benefits, usually for law enforcement and
public safety, as against any resulting interference with individual liberty
‡
A much earlier version of this case comment was originally published on Osgoode Hall
Law School‟s Blog, online at: <http://www.TheCourt.ca>, and then reproduced with permission in
(2009) 30(2) For the Defence, Criminal Lawyers’ Association Newsletter 26. The research assistance
of Yulia Pesin (Osgoode, LL.B. 2011) is gratefully acknowledged.
*
Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School at York University.
1
[2008] S.C.J. No. 18, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 456 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Kang-Brown”].
2
[2008] S.C.J. No. 19, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 569 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “M. (A.)”].
3
See, e.g., Kirk Makin, “Top court puts leash on random searches by sniffer dogs”, The
Globe and Mail (April 26, 2008), A15.
4
The source of police duties is derived from legislation, usually the legislation governing
the police in the particular jurisdiction, and tends to define police duties in rather broad terms:
“preserving the peace”, “preventing crimes and other offences”, “apprehending criminals and other
offenders” etc. See, e.g., Police Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.15, s. 42.
5
It invariably will be, unless the officer is involved in some entirely illegitimate activity
completely unrelated to his or her official duties. See Brown v. Durham Regional Police Force,
[1998] O.J. No. 5274, 131 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at 116-17 (Ont. C.A.).
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interests. If the benefits are characterized as outweighing the costs, the
action is said to be “justifiable” and a new police power is born.6
Ever since the Supreme Court of Canada first used the ancillary
powers doctrine to fashion a new police power in Dedman,7 criticism of
the doctrine has been unrelenting. Originally, it came in the form of a
scathing dissent by Dickson C.J.C. He categorically rejected that R. v.
Waterfield,8 the English decision that the majority fastened upon as
supplying the authority for an ancillary powers doctrine, authorized
courts to create new police powers. Chief Justice Dickson expressed
serious reservations regarding this move, which he saw as “nothing short
of a fiat for illegality on the part of the police whenever the benefit of
police action appeared to outweigh the infringement of an individual‟s
rights”.9 For him, it was “the function of the legislature, not the courts, to
authorize ... police action that would otherwise be unlawful as a violation
of rights traditionally protected at common law”.10
While members of the judiciary voiced initial criticism regarding the
use of the ancillary powers doctrine to create new police powers, over
the last 25 years skepticism has come almost exclusively from
commentators.11 In the interim, the Supreme Court has uncritically
6
See R. v. Dedman, [1985] S.C.J. No. 45, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 2 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Dedman”]. See also R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59, at para. 24 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Mann”].
7
Dedman, id., was the first case in which the Supreme Court of Canada recognized the
doctrine as a bases for creating new police powers. In that case, it was a power to briefly detain
motorists at sobriety check-stops.
8
[1964] 1 Q.B. 164 (Ct. Crim. App.) [hereinafter “Waterfield”].
9
Dedman, supra, note 6, at 15 (quoting Reference re Judicature Act (Alberta), s. 27(1),
[1984] S.C.J. No. 64, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 697, at 718-19 (S.C.C.), Dickson J., dissenting) [hereinafter
“Wiretap Reference”].
10
Id.
11
See generally Howard Chisvin, “R. v. Dedman: Annotation” (1985) 34 M.V.R. 165; Glen
Luther, “Police Power and The Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Creation or Control” (1986) 51
Sask. L. Rev. 117; R.J. Delisle, “Judicial Creation of Police Powers” (1993) 20 C.R. (4th) 29;
Heather Pringle, “The Smoke and Mirrors of Godoy: Creating Common Law Authority While
Making Feeney Disappear” (1999) 21 C.R. (5th) 227; Don Stuart, “Time to Recodify Criminal Law
and Rise Above Law and Order Expediency: Lessons from the Manitoba Warriors Prosecution”
(2000) 28 Man. L.J. 89; Aman S. Patel, “Detention and Articulable Cause: Arbitrariness and
Growing Judicial Deference to Police Judgment” (2000) 45 Crim. L.Q. 198; Steve Coughlan,
“Search Based on Articulable Cause: Proceed with Caution or Full Stop?” (2002) 2 C.R. (6th) 49;
Lesley A. MCoy, “Liberty‟s Last Stand? Tracing the Limits of Investigative Detention” (2002) 46
Crim. L.Q. 319; Peter Sankoff, “Articulable Cause Based Searches Incident to Detention — This
Cooke May Spoil the Broth” (2002) 2 C.R. (6th) 41; James Stribopoulos, “A Failed Experiment?
Investigative Detention: Ten Years Later” (2003) 41 Alta. L. Rev. 335 [hereinafter “Stribopoulos, A
„Failed Experiment?‟”]; Lesley A. McCoy, “Some Answers from the Supreme Court on
Investigative Detention … and Some More Questions” (2004) 49 Crim. L.Q. 268 [hereinafter
“McCoy, „Some Answers … More Questions‟”]; Tim Quigley, “Mann, It‟s a Disappointing
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accepted use of the ancillary powers doctrine as bases for recognizing a
host of entirely unprecedented police powers. For example:







a power to briefly detain motorists at sobriety checkstops;12
a power to enter premises in response to disconnected 911 calls;13
a power to briefly detain individuals who are reasonably suspected of
involvement in recently committed or unfolding criminal activity,
and to conduct protective weapons searches of such individuals
where an officer has well-founded safety concerns;14
a power to ask drivers questions about alcohol consumption and
request their participation in sobriety tests without first complying
with s. 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms;15 and
a power to conduct criminal investigative roadblock stops where
such a stop is tailored to the information possessed by police, the
seriousness of the offence being investigated, and the temporal and
geographic connection between the situation being investigated and
the timing and location of the roadblock.16

Kang-Brown and M. (A.) represent a continuation of this judicial
law-making trend. As explained in Part II, below, these judgments
effectively recognize that when reasonable grounds exist to suspect an
individual is carrying narcotics, the police have the common law
authority to use a drug detecting dog to sniff the individual suspect, as
Decision” (2004) 21 C.R. (6th) 41; Tim Quigley, “Brief Investigatory Detentions: A Critique of R. v.
Simpson” (2004) 41 Alta. L. Rev. 93; Patrick Healy, “Investigative Detention in Canada” [2005]
Crim. L.R. 98 [hereinafter “Healy”]; Joseph R. Marin, “R. v. Mann: Further Down the Slippery
Slope” (2005) 42 Alta. L. Rev. 1123 [hereinafter “Marin, „Further Down the Slippery Slope‟”];
James Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Police Powers and the Charter”
(2005) 31 Queen‟s L.J. 1 [hereinafter “Stribopoulos, „In Search of Dialogue‟”]; Christina Skibinsky,
“Regulating Mann in Canada” (2006) 69 Sask. L. Rev. 197; James Stribopoulos, “The Limits of
Judicially Created Police Powers: Investigative Detention after Mann” (2007) 52 Crim. L.Q. 299
[hereinafter “Stribopoulos, „Limits‟”]; Steve Coughlan, “Common Law Police Powers and the Rule
of Law” (2007) 47 C.R. (6th) 266; Don Stuart, “The Unfortunate Dilution of Section 8 Protection:
Some Teeth Remain” (1999) 25 Queen‟s L.J. 65; Don Stuart “Godoy: The Supreme Reverts to the
Ancillary Powers Doctrine to Fill a Gap in Police Power” (1999) 21 C.R. (5th) 225. However, in
fairness, Don Stuart seems to have changed his mind recently about the ancillary powers doctrine.
See Don Stuart, “Charter Standards for Investigative Powers: Have the Courts Got the Balance
Right?” in Jamie Cameron & James Stribopoulos, eds., The Charter and Criminal Justice: TwentyFive Years Later (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2008) 4.
12
Dedman, supra, note 6.
13
R. v. Godoy, [1999] S.C.J. No. 85, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 311 [hereinafter “Godoy”].
14
Mann, supra, note 6.
15
R. v. Orbanski; R. v. Elias, [2005] S.C.J. No. 37, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Orbanski & Elias”]. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
16
R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 725 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Clayton”].
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well as his or her belongings, in order to confirm or refute that suspicion.
Although these judgments are noteworthy for what they say about police
use of drug-sniffing dogs, they are far more significant for what they say
about the ancillary powers doctrine.
In Kang-Brown and M. (A.), for the first time since Dickson C.J.C.‟s
dissent in Dedman, disagreement has broken out between the Supreme
Court judges regarding the propriety of the Court using the ancillary
powers doctrine to create new police powers.17 This disagreement
strongly suggests that the fate of this doctrine as a future source of police
powers may suddenly be in doubt.
This short paper will critically evaluate the Court‟s judgments in
Kang-Brown and M. (A.). Part I will explain the Court‟s conclusion that
the use of drug-sniffing dogs involves an intrusion upon reasonable
privacy expectations, so as to engage the protections found in section 8
of the Charter. What section 8 demands before such searches will be
considered “reasonable” is explored in Part III. Finally, Part IV will
address the unexpected disagreement that has emerged between the
judges on the use of the ancillary powers doctrine to create new police
powers. This will include a critical evaluation of both sides in this
emerging, and long overdue, judicial debate.

II. DOGS “SEARCH” WHEN THEY SNIFF FOR NARCOTICS
Importantly, all nine justices (essentially) agreed that when a police
dog trained to sniff out narcotics focuses its olfactory powers on an
individual‟s knapsack or luggage, the target‟s reasonable privacy
expectations are encroached upon. In other words, this constitutes a
“search” for section 8 Charter purposes, a conclusion that triggers the
“reasonableness” requirements of the guarantee.
This conclusion may seem obvious to many. After all, if the dog isn‟t
“searching” when it is “sniffing” at someone‟s bag, what is the point of
the sniff? Amazingly, however, the answer did not seem entirely clearcut as these two cases made their way before the Supreme Court of
Canada. This was primarily because the United States Supreme Court
long ago decided that dog sniffs do not constitute a “search” for Fourth
17

To be clear, in dissent in Orbanski & Elias, supra, note 15, LeBel J. (joined by Fish J.)
did express strong skepticism toward the use of “law-making powers by the courts”, including the
expansion of the common law, to fill gaps in formal police powers. Id., at paras. 69-70, 80-84. But
unlike in Kang-Brown, supra, note 1, the majority in Orbanski & Elias did not take the opportunity
to respond directly to these concerns.
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Amendment purposes. In United States v. Place,18 the U.S. Supreme
Court came to this conclusion because, as O‟Connor J. explained for the
majority:
… the sniff discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a
contraband item. Thus, despite the fact that the sniff tells the authorities
something about the contents of the luggage, the information obtained
is limited. This limited disclosure also ensures that the owner of the
property is not subjected to the embarrassment and inconvenience
entailed in less discriminate and more intrusive investigative methods.
In these respects, the canine sniff is sui generis. We are aware of no
other investigative procedure that is so limited both in the manner in
which the information is obtained and in the content of the information
revealed by the procedure. Therefore, we conclude that the particular
course of investigation that the agents intended to pursue here —
exposure of respondent‟s luggage, which was located in a public place,
to a trained canine — did not constitute a “search” within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment.19

In light of this decision, there was concern that our top court might
come to a similar conclusion. More specifically, it was feared that the
Court might draw too ready a parallel between the odour of drugs
emanating from luggage and waste heat emanating from a home. 20 In R.
v. Tessling,21 the Supreme Court of Canada held that police use of the
FLIR (Forward Looking Infra-Red device), a heat detecting device used
to spot unusual amounts of heat escaping from a home, a tell-tale sign of
marijuana grow lamps, did not constitute a “search” for section 8
purposes. In Tessling, the Court characterized the information gleaned
from the FLIR as “meaningless” because poor insulation, a pottery kiln,
a hot bath or a sauna could also have caused the unusually hot heat
signature.22 Thankfully, in Kang-Brown and M. (A.) the Court recognized

462 U.S. 696 (1983) [hereinafter “Place”].
Id., at 707.
See, e.g., Don Stuart, “R. v. M. (A.): Annotation” (2006) 37 C.R. (6th) 372 and the cases
he cites applying R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Tessling”] in this way.
21
Id.
22
Although such information, in the abstract, may seem unimportant and inconsequential,
in Tessling, id., when combined with a confidential informant‟s tip, it proved sufficient for the
issuance of a search warrant: hardly “meaningless”, to be sure. See Steve Coughlan & Marc S.
Gorbet, “Nothing Plus Nothing Equals … Something? A Proposal for FLIR Warrants on Reasonable
Suspicion” (2005) 23 C.R. (6th) 239.
18
19
20
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a significant difference between the use of the FLIR and the use of drug
detecting dogs.
A properly trained dog is capable of telling its handler something
extraordinarily meaningful, that a narcotic is being secreted. The
Supreme Court of Canada refused to follow the lead of its American
counterpart, remembering its earlier precedents, which make clear that
the unlawful nature of the targeted conduct does not vitiate an
individual‟s reasonable privacy expectations.23 To hold otherwise, Binnie
J. recognized, writing on behalf of a majority of the justices in KangBrown on this point, would mean that all Canadians, innocent or guilty,
would henceforth be subject to having their persons and effects sniffed at
by police drug detecting dogs, at the whim of law enforcement,
whenever they happened to move through public spaces. This possibility,
Binnie J. concluded, is not at all in keeping with the idea of a free
society.24
Although Binnie J.‟s concerns about the impact of allowing police to
use drug-sniffing dogs at their sole discretion may seem alarmist to
some, the experience in the United States in the aftermath of Place
suggests otherwise. There, the holding that the Fourth Amendment is not
engaged has meant that drug-sniffing dogs have become a routine part of
American life, with dogs sniffing at individuals and their belongings
when they happen to be in transit, either by plane, bus, train or car.
Beyond travellers, schools and their students are also regularly targeted
for visits by police officers and their drug-sniffing dogs. Absent any
constitutional constraints, the only real limits on the use of such dogs are
police ingenuity and resources.25 Remembering that experience, the
Supreme Court of Canada was undoubtedly right to conclude that our
Constitution should demand more.

III. “REASONABLENESS” AND DRUG-SNIFFING DOG SEARCHES
Consensus among the justices broke down, however, when it came to
passing on what section 8 of the Charter demands for such searches to be
23

See, e.g., R. v. Wong, [1990] S.C.J. No. 118, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter

“Wong”].
24

Kang-Brown, supra, note 1, at para. 71.
See, e.g., Hope Walker Hall, “Sniffing Out the Fourth Amendment: United States v.
Place — Dog Sniff — Ten Years Later” (1994) 46 Me. L. Rev. 151, at 171-84, who details the
steady expansion of Place to a variety of different contexts. For a review and critique of the United
States Supreme Court‟s jurisprudence on the use of drug-sniffing dogs, see Ken Lammers, “Canine
Sniffs: The Search That Isn‟t” (2003) 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 845.
25

(2009), 47 S.C.L.R. (2d)

ANCILLARY POWERS IMPLICATIONS

41

considered “reasonable”. R. v. Collins26 long ago established that to be
“reasonable” a search or seizure must satisfy three preconditions: (1) it
must be authorized by law; (2) the law itself must be reasonable; and (3)
it must be carried out in a reasonable manner.27 Disagreement among the
nine justices regarding the first and second preconditions is what led to
four separate sets of reasons in Kang-Brown and M. (A.).
We will return to their disagreement regarding Collins‟ first requirement
in Part IV, as that discussion involves the ancillary power doctrine and
supplies our main focus. For now, a few words about the controversy
surrounding the second requirement, that the law authorizing the search
be reasonable. With respect to that precondition the judges were sharply
divided on the evidentiary threshold required to justify the use of drugsniffing dogs.
Four justices (McLachlin C.J.C. and Binnie, Deschamps and Rothstein
JJ.) were of the view that reasonable suspicion that a person is carrying
narcotics is what section 8 demands before a drug-sniffing dog can be
used by police. This bloc emphasized that relative to other kinds of
searches, a dog sniff is comparatively less intrusive and, therefore,
should be permitted on a less exacting standard than that normally
required by section 8, i.e., reasonable and probable grounds.28
In contrast, four of the other justices (LeBel, Fish, Abella and Charron
JJ.) concluded that the more exacting reasonable and probable grounds
standard is indeed what section 8 requires, refusing to countenance a
lessening of the standard in this context. For this bloc, even though
physically less intrusive, the information gleaned through the use of drug
sniffing dogs is just as private and worthy of protection as it would be if
the police instead reached inside an individual‟s pockets or looked inside
an individual‟s bag to probe for evidence.
The tie-breaker on this important issue was Bastarache J. He went
much further than Binnie J. was prepared to go, agreeing that reasonable
suspicion is indeed the appropriate standard, but expressing the view that
[1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Collins”].
Id., at 278. See also R. v. Evans, [1996] S.C.J. No.1, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 8, at 23 (S.C.C.).
In both judgments, Binnie J., effectively writing for the majority on the applicable
constitutional standard, emphasized that the dogs were used for “routine crime investigation” and
that the cases did not involve “explosives, guns or other public safety concerns”. See Kang-Brown,
supra, note 1, at para. 18, per Binnie J., and M. (A.), supra, note 2, at para. 3, per Binnie J. In
M. (A.), he goes on to suggest that where a potential threat to public safety is the motivation, “even if
speculative”, “the legal balance would have come down on the side of the use of sniffer dogs to get
to the bottom of a possible threat”: id., at para. 37, strongly suggesting that sniffer dogs trained to
detect guns and explosives could be used to counter threats to public safety without the need for
particularized suspicion.
26
27
28
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it need not be individualized to justify the use of such dogs. Rather, a
generalized suspicion, for example, that drugs are routinely being
trafficked through a particular location (like a bus depot or an airport),
would be enough to justify the use of drug-detecting dogs to sniff at
travellers and their belongings.
The effect of Bastarache J.‟s vote is that reasonable suspicion emerges
as the controlling constitutional standard in this context. And, given that
four of the justices insisted that it be of a particularized nature, the clear
implication would seem to be that before police can use such dogs to
sniff at an individual or his or her belongings, section 8 of the Charter
requires that they possess reasonable grounds to suspect that the person
is carrying narcotics on his or her person or inside his or her belongings.
The emergence of reasonable suspicion as the controlling constitutional
standard for the use of drug-sniffing dogs for criminal investigative
purposes seems like a sensible compromise. Had the Court held that
“reasonable and probable grounds to believe” was the applicable
standard, which was the position of the minority, the use of such dogs
would have been rendered practically unimportant. If the police possess
reasonable and probable grounds to believe an individual is carrying a
controlled substance they are legally entitled to arrest that person.29 Once
an individual is lawfully arrested the police are then entitled to search his
or her person, belongings and surroundings.30 In fact, such a search may
even precede the arrest, provided that the requisite grounds are in place
at the time of the search.31 Consequently, there would be no practical
need for police to resort to drug-sniffing dogs if reasonable and probable
grounds had emerged as the controlling constitutional standard.
Practicalities aside, the reasonable suspicion standard also makes
good sense in this context as a matter of constitutional principle. Hunter
v. Southam Inc.32 made clear that reasonableness is a context-specific
determination.33 This left an opening for requiring less onerous safeguards
29
See Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 495(1)(a). On the reasonable and probable
grounds standard, as it applies to arrest, see R. v. Storrey, [1990] S.C.J. No. 12 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 241
(S.C.C.).
30
See generally R. v. Caslake, [1998] S.C.J. No. 3, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 51 (S.C.C.).
31
See R. v. Debot, [1986] O.J. No. 994, 30 C.C.C. (3d) 207, at 223-25 (Ont. C.A.), affd
[1989] S.C.J. No. 118, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1140, 52 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.) but without addressing
this discrete issue.
32
[1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Hunter v. Southam”, cited to C.C.C.].
33
For example, the Court noted that where “the State‟s interest is not simply law
enforcement as, for instance, where State security is involved, or where the individual‟s interest is
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for searches in the regulatory, administrative, customs and school
contexts.34 Admittedly, where the state‟s purpose is criminal law
enforcement, the Supreme Court has usually insisted on strict adherence
to Hunter v. Southam‟s requirements,35 including the need for reasonable
and probable grounds as a precondition for a constitutional search or
seizure.36 There are, however, some sensible exceptions that have also
been carved out in the criminal investigative realm.
The rationale behind these exceptions has been twofold: first, the
privacy expectation involved and, second, the intrusiveness of the search
power being considered. In cases where privacy expectations are high
and the search power is quite intrusive, such as where state action would
interfere with an individual‟s bodily integrity, the Supreme Court has
indicated that even greater protections than those demanded by Hunter v.
Southam are required.37 In contrast, where privacy expectations are
diminished and the search power is not very intrusive, the Supreme Court
has accepted as constitutional slight deviations from the reasonable and
probable grounds standard.38
not simply his expectation of privacy as, for instance, when the search threatens his bodily integrity,
the relevant standard might well be a different one”, id., at 114-15.
34
With respect to border searches, see R. v. Simmons, [1988] S.C.J. No. 86, [1988] 2 S.C.R.
495 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Simmons”]; R. v. Jacques, [1996] S.C.J. No. 88, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 312
(S.C.C.); R. v. Monney, [1999] S.C.J. No. 18, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 652, 133 C.C.C. (3d) 129 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Monney”, cited to C.C.C.]. With respect to administrative searches, see Comité
paritaire de l’industrie de la chemise v. Potash, [1994] S.C.J. No. 7, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 406 (S.C.C.);
Thomson Newspapers v. Canada, [1990] S.C.J. No. 23, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425 (S.C.C.); R. v.
McKinlay Transport Ltd., [1990] S.C.J. No. 25, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 627 (S.C.C.). With respect to school
searches, see R. v. M. (M.R.), [1998] S.C.J. No. 83, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 393 (S.C.C.).
35
For example, the Court has specifically cautioned “that departures from the Hunter v.
Southam standards that will be considered reasonable will be exceedingly rare”. See Simmons,
id., at 319.
36
Hunter v. Southam, supra, note 32, at 112-15. The other requirements are a warrant,
where it is feasible to obtain one (id., at 109-10) and the need for someone capable of acting
judicially (i.e., a judge or justice of the peace) to pass on the adequacy of the grounds for the
issuance of the warrant (id., at 112-15).
37
See R. v. Dyment, [1988] S.C.J. No. 82, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417, 45 C.C.C. (3d) 244 (S.C.C.)
(“when the search and seizure relates to the integrity of the body rather than the home, for example,
the standard is even higher than usual”, at 262 C.C.C.). See also Monney, supra, note 34, at 151-52;
R. v. Stillman, [1997] S.C.J. No. 34, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607, 113 C.C.C. (3d) 321, at 342 (S.C.C.); R. v.
Golden, [2001] S.C.J. No. 81, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 679, at para. 88 (S.C.C.).
38
See, e.g., R. v. Wise, [1992] S.C.J. No. 16, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 527, 70 C.C.C. (3d) 193, at
229 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Wise”] (after noting that the privacy expectation in one‟s vehicle is
“markedly diminished” relative to one‟s home or office, the Court indicated that given that an
electronic tracking device only reveals a vehicle‟s location, it is “a less intrusive means of
surveillance than electronic audio or video surveillance. Accordingly, a lower standard such as a
„solid ground‟ for suspicion would be a basis for obtaining an authorization from an independent
authority, such as a justice of the peace, to install a device and monitor the movements of a
vehicle”). Arguably, the pat-down protective search power recognized in Mann, supra, note 6, also
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Although a dog sniff is self-evidently a “search”, relative to other
searches it is arguably at the more benign end on the spectrum of
intrusiveness.39 To be effective it requires little more than the target
briefly holding still as the dog passes by in close enough proximity to
sniff at the person and his or her belongings. Unlike most other searches,
there is no need for law enforcement officials to physically handle either
the individual or his or her personal items. In short, the majority‟s
conclusion that “reasonable suspicion” strikes the right constitutional
balance between state and individual interests in this context seems
conceptually sound.
A closer reading of LeBel J.‟s judgment in Kang-Brown suggests
that the minority might have been inclined to agree, had the deviation
from Hunter v. Southam standards come from Parliament rather than
from the majority‟s judgment. Justice LeBel explains this subtle but
important distinction:
A statutory provision on the appropriate use of sniffer dogs in law
enforcement on grounds that fall short of the standard established in
Hunter v. Southam might require justification under s. 1, but state
action would not be foreclosed so long as the standard for justification
was met under the relevant constitutional test. A requirement that
Parliament act first would put the courts in a better position to address
the competing interests at play and would ensure that the justification
process meets constitutional standards. The extension of common law
police powers as proposed in this case would shortcut the justification
process and leave the Court to frame the common law rule itself
without the full benefit of the dialogue and discussion that would have
taken place had Parliament acted and been required to justify its
action.40

In other words, deviations from Hunter v. Southam‟s basic constitutional
requirements are something that should be left for Parliament, with the
falls into this category. That power would seem to be contingent on the detaining officer having
reasonable grounds to suspect that the individual detained may be carrying a weapon, an
understandable deviation from the “reasonable and probable grounds” standard, in light of the less
intrusive nature of the search (a pat-down, with no probing into pockets or under clothing) and the
important and limited interest being served (police safety rather than evidence acquisition). See
Mann, id., 14 at paras. 36-45. Unfortunately, the Court‟s choice of language in Mann in articulating
the relevant standard is itself confusing. See Stribopoulos, “Limits”, supra, note 11, at 310-11.
39
Of course assuming that the dog is well behaved. Obviously if police use an ill-tempered
dog different considerations arise; for example, concerns about the reasonableness of the manner in
which the search is carried out, under the third prong of Collins, may arise. See supra, notes 26-27
and accompanying text.
40
Kang-Brown, supra, note 1, at para. 14.
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Court‟s role limited to whether in a particular situation a legislated
exception can be reasonably justified under section 1 of the Charter. This
leads directly to a much larger controversy regarding the role of the
Supreme Court of Canada under the Charter on questions pertaining to
the source and scope of police powers.

IV. THE LARGER IMPLICATIONS: THE FATE OF
JUDICIALLY CREATED POLICE POWERS
No statute authorizes the use of drug-sniffing dogs by police. As a
result, legal authority for their use, if it exists, must be derived from the
common law. If one were to examine the “common law” as it has been
historically understood in England and throughout the Commonwealth,
i.e., the written reasons of judges from previously decided cases, one will
find no mention of drug-sniffing dogs. I do not mean to suggest by this
that the common law is somehow static. To the contrary, the great genius
of the common law system is indeed its organic nature; specifically, the
ability of judges to apply established tools of legal reasoning to
incrementally expand existing principles in response to the changing
needs of society.41
Historically, when it came to government interfering with individual
liberties, our courts were very reluctant to use their law-making authority
to expand state powers. In fact, in this context, the common law courts
traditionally showed much restraint. That restraint eventually became the
bedrock of English constitutional law, taking the “principle of legality”
as its label. Applying that principle, common law courts have long
insisted that any interference with individual liberty or property rights be
premised on clear legal authority. Absent such authority, the common
law erred on the side of individual freedom.42 It is in this sense that the

41
See generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Nature of the Common Law (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1988), who explains the common law ideal of “doctrinal stability”, which
finds expression in the concept of stare decisis. According to Eisenberg, “the courts must establish
and apply rules that are supported by the general standards of society or the special standards of the
legal system, and must adopt a process of reasoning that is replicable by the profession.” Id., at 47.
Eisenberg goes on to provide a very useful taxonomy of the various modes of common law legal
reasoning, which include: (1) Reasoning from Precedent; (2) Reasoning from Principle; (3)
Reasoning by Analogy; (4) Reasoning from Doctrines Established in the Professional Literature; (5)
Reasoning from Hypotheticals. Id., at 50-103.
42
For a detailed discussion of the principle of legality, including its origins and its
recognition in Canadian law, see Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue”, supra, note 11, at 6-13.
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common law has been viewed, in the words of LeBel J. as the “law of
liberty”.43
In the search and seizure context the principle of legality has a very
long lineage. It can be traced all the way back to Entick v. Carrington,44
one of England‟s earliest and most celebrated search cases. In that
judgment the court refused a government request that it recognize, for the
first time, an entirely unprecedented power on the part of the Secretary of
State for the Northern Department to issue search warrants. In rejecting
that request, Lord Chief Justice Camden remarked:
What would the parliament say, if the judges should take upon
themselves to mould an unlawful power into a convenient authority, by
new restrictions? That would be, not judgment, but legislation. 45

This same approach carried forward to Canada. In the early years of
the Charter there was only one anomalous exception: Dedman.46 In that
case a slim (five-judge) majority of the Supreme Court seized on what
was, up until that time, a relatively obscure decision of the English Court
of Criminal Appeals in Waterfield,47 which had set down a two-part test
for assessing whether a police officer was acting in “execution of his
duty”.48 (This was an element of the offence charged in that case.) In
Dedman, however, the majority fastened on this test, and the cost-benefit
analysis that it endorsed, transforming it into a basis for recognizing
entirely new police powers. The power ultimately recognized in Dedman
was the authority of police to conduct sobriety check-stops. As noted
above, Dickson J. wrote a scathing dissent, strikingly reminiscent of
Camden J.‟s opinion in Entick v. Carrington, in which he admonished
43

Kang-Brown, supra, note 1, at para. 12, LeBel J. concurring.
(1765), Howell‟s State Trials 1030.
Id., at 1068.
46
Dedman, supra, note 6.
47
Waterfield, supra, note 8.
48
The relevant passage from Waterfield, id., provides, at 661:
In most cases it is probably more convenient to consider what the police constable was
actually doing and in particular whether such conduct was prima facie an unlawful
interference with a person‟s liberty or property. If so, it is then relevant to consider
whether (a) such conduct falls within the general scope of any duty imposed by statute or
recognised at common law and (b) whether such conduct, albeit within the general scope
of such a duty, involved an unjustifiable use of police powers associated with the duty.
Thus, while it is no doubt right to say in general terms that police constables have a duty
to prevent crime and a duty, when crime is committed, to bring the offender to justice, it
is also clear from the decided cases that when the execution of these general duties
involves interference with the person or property of a private person, the powers of
constables are not unlimited.
44
45
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the majority for taking on a law-making role that more appropriately
belonged to Parliament.
For a while, at least, the law-making authority that Dedman
recognized seemed to lie dormant. In the interim, the Supreme Court of
Canada repeatedly refused to recognize new police powers in response to
Charter challenges under section 8, thereby engaging Parliament in a
form of dialogue that led to the creation of a number of much needed
legislated search powers.49 During this period, the Supreme Court sent
strong signals that it would not again use the ancillary powers doctrine to
create new police powers. As La Forest J. explained, on behalf of the
majority in Wong:
The common law powers of search were extremely narrow, and the
courts have left it to Parliament to extend them where need be … it
does not sit well for the courts, as the protectors of our fundamental
rights, to widen the possibility of encroachments on these personal
liberties. It falls to Parliament to make incursions on fundamental rights
if it is of the view that they are needed for the protection of the public
in a properly balanced system of criminal justice. 50

This is how things remained throughout most of the 1990s under the
Lamer Court, with only one isolated exception.51
The turning point seemed to come in Mann,52 when the Supreme
Court used the ancillary powers doctrine to recognize a police power to
briefly detain an individual if a police officer has reasonable grounds to
suspect that the individual is involved in recently committed or unfolding
criminal activity. That power was combined with a limited protective
pat-down search power, available where police have objectively based
grounds to be concerned for their safety. Rather ironic was the Supreme
Court‟s failure to acknowledge the extensive body of case law, cases that
predated lower court developments that applied the Waterfield test to
recognize an investigative detention power, which had clearly and
consistently held that at common law there is no power to detain for
investigative purposes short of actual arrest.53
49
I have elsewhere chronicled all this in far greater detail: see Stribopoulos, “In Search of
Dialogue”, supra, note 11.
50
Supra, note 23, at 56.
51
See Godoy, supra, note 13, applying the Waterfield test to recognize a police power to
enter private premises to investigate disconnected 911 calls.
52
Mann, supra, note 6.
53
See R. v. Hicks, [1988] O.J. No. 957, 42 C.C.C. (3d) 394, at 400 (Ont. C.A.), affd on
other grounds, [1988] S.C.J. No. 7, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 120 (S.C.C.); R. v. Moran, [1987] O.J. No. 794,
36 C.C.C. (3d) 225, at 258 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [1988] S.C.C.A. No. 213 (S.C.C.);
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With few exceptions, Mann has been widely criticized by
commentators (myself included).54 The chief complaint regarding the
decision is that it tends to raise more questions than it answers, and in the
process creates much confusion and thereby increases the chances of
unjustified and abusive police stops.55 In this sense, it provides a
textbook example of the problems inherent when the courts exceed their
institutional capacities and begin creating entirely new and unprecedented
police powers, taking on an almost legislative rather than judicial role.56
Nevertheless, given the complexity of the issues raised by Mann, the
case seemed to signal that any reluctance the Supreme Court had
periodically expressed about creating new police powers had fallen by
the wayside. Since Mann was decided, the Supreme Court has used the
ancillary powers doctrine to recognize some rather significant and
entirely unprecedented police powers.57
And then came the Supreme Court‟s decisions in Kang-Brown and
M. (A.). Suddenly, for the first time since Dedman, a debate broke out
among the justices regarding the legitimacy and efficacy of using the
ancillary powers doctrine to create new police powers.
In a concurring judgment in Kang-Brown, LeBel J. (joined by Fish,
Abella and Charron JJ.) refused to use the ancillary powers doctrine to
recognize a “common law” power on the part of police to use drugsniffing dogs. In a judgment strongly reminiscent of the Supreme Court‟s
pronouncements in the 1980s and early 1990s, this group rejected the
idea that it was the Court‟s role to fill the gaps in formal police powers.
Justice LeBel wrote:

R. v. Esposito, [1985] O.J. No. 1002, 24 C.C.C. (3d) 88, at 94 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused,
[1986] S.C.C.A. No. 63, [1986] 1 S.C.R. viii (S.C.C.); R. v. Dedman, [1981] O.J. No. 2993, 59
C.C.C. (2d) 97, at 108-109 (Ont. C.A.), affd on other grounds [1985] S.C.J. No. 45, [1985] 2 S.C.R.
2 (S.C.C.); R. v. Cluett, [1982] N.S.J. No. 542, 3 C.C.C. (3d) 333, at 347-48 (N.S.C.A.), revd on
other grounds [1985] S.C.J. No. 54, 21 C.C.C. (3d) 318 (S.C.C.); R. v. Guthrie, [1982] A.J. No. 29,
69 C.C.C. (2d) 216, at 218-19 (Alta. C.A.); R. v. Moore, [1978] S.C.J. No. 82, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 195,
43 C.C.C. (2d) 83, at 89-90 (S.C.C.); Rice v. Connolly, [1966] 2 Q.B. 414, at 419 (C.A.); Kenlin v.
Gardner, [1967] 2 Q.B. 510 (C.A.); Koechlin v. Waugh and Hamilton, [1958] O.J. No. 105, 118
C.C.C. 24, at 26-27 (Ont. C.A.).
54
See supra, note 11.
55
See for example McCoy, “Some Answers … More Questions”, supra, note 11; Marin,
“Further Down the Slippery Slope”, supra, note 11; Stribopoulos, “Limits”, supra, note 11.
56
See generally Stribopoulos, id.
57
See supra, notes 15 and 16 and accompanying text. Although LeBel and Fish JJ. had
expressed strong skepticism about this sort of ad hoc law-making in their dissenting judgment in
Orbanski & Elias, supra, note 15, their vote in favour of recognizing a police power at “common
law” to conduct roadblocks for criminal investigative purposes in Clayton, supra, note 16, seemed to
signal a possible change of heart.
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The common law has long been viewed as a law of liberty. Should we
move away from that tradition, which is still part of the ethos of our
legal system and of our democracy? This case is about the freedom of
individuals and the proper function of the courts as guardians of the
Constitution. I doubt that it should lead us to depart from the common
law tradition of freedom by changing the common law itself to restrict
the freedoms protected by the Constitution under s. 8 of the Charter. 58

More practically, LeBel J. explained this reluctance by noting: “the
courts are ill-equipped to develop an adequate legal framework for the
use of police dogs”. 59
It is difficult to quarrel with these observations about the historic
importance of the common law in protecting liberty and the need for
courts to act with restraint before recognizing new police powers,
especially where those powers would have complex and far-reaching
consequences.
The only troubling aspect of LeBel J.‟s analysis is his failure to
convincingly explain why it was appropriate in Mann and Clayton to use
the ancillary powers doctrine in this way, whereas it was inappropriate to
do so in these cases. The complexity of the various issues raised by
investigative detention power (for example, the use of force to effect
such detentions, the temporal and geographic limits on them, the
difficulty in reconciling this power with the right to counsel on detention
found in section 10(b) of the Charter, and what, if any, corresponding
obligations the power might impose on those detained, etc.60) suggests
that, if anything, the dog-sniff power is better suited for recognition
under the ancillary powers doctrine than were investigative detentions.
In his concurring reasons in Kang-Brown, Binnie J. (joined by
McLachlin C.J.C.) took exception to this sudden trepidation on the part
of LeBel, Fish, Abella and Charon JJ. For Binnie J., the use of the
ancillary powers doctrine to create new police powers is part of a long
tradition of “incremental” expansion of the common law. That doctrine
simply provides courts with a methodology, like many judge-created
methodologies used by common law courts over time, to develop the law
in a particular area.61
With respect, the difficulty with this view is that it largely ignores
the fact that there is nothing at all “incremental” about how new police
58
59
60
61

Kang-Brown, supra, note 1, at para. 12.
Id., at para. 15.
See generally Stribopoulos, “Limits”, supra, note 11.
Kang-Brown, supra, note 1, at paras. 50-51.
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powers are created under the cost-benefit analysis supplied by the
ancillary powers doctrine. The truth is, our courts have used the doctrine
to create police powers out of whole cloth. These new powers have no
linkage to earlier judgments, and sometimes serve to implicitly overrule
cases that pronounced on the absence of any such power (i.e.,
investigative detention providing the best example). This reality seems to
contradict Binnie J.‟s rather charitable characterization of the ancillary
powers doctrine.
In addition, Binnie J.‟s defence of the ancillary powers doctrine in
Kang-Brown runs up against his rather frank acknowledgment in
Clayton, where he agrees “with the critics that Waterfield is an odd
godfather for common law police powers”.62
That said, Binnie J. does seem to have the better argument at points.
In his reasons in Kang-Brown he rightly complains that the approach
advocated by LeBel J. would breed even greater uncertainty. Litigants
would have no way of knowing what approach the Court might be
inclined to employ in a given case, one in which it is receptive to
creating new police powers under the Waterfield test or one in which it
insists on deferring such law-making responsibilities to Parliament.63
For Binnie J. the question was settled long ago. The only way
forward, he insists, is for the courts to “proceed incrementally with the
Waterfield/Dedman analysis of common law police powers rather than
try to re-cross the Rubicon to retrieve the fallen flag of the Dedman
dissent”.64
One is left to wonder, however, whether “crossing the Rubicon” is
ever an appropriate analogy when it comes to judicial decision-making.
For example, would it have answered the claim made in Brown v. Board
of Education65 that the United States Supreme Court had already crossed
the Rubicon when it decided in Plessy v. Ferguson66 that “separate but
equal” was consistent with the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment?
Or, looking for a more contemporary and Canadian example, how
sound a response would it have been for the Supreme Court of Canada in
R. v. Henry67 to refuse to reconsider its earlier judgments because it had
62
63
64
65
66
67

Clayton, supra, note 16, at para. 75.
Kang-Brown, supra, note 1, at para. 22.
Id., at para. 51.
347 U.S. 483 (1958).
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
[2005] S.C.J. No. 76, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 609 (S.C.C.).
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already crossed the Rubicon under section 13 of the Charter by
repeatedly embracing the unworkable incrimination versus impeachment
distinction?
My point is, even questions that seem settled are not always so. As I
have argued elsewhere:
In part, the long-term viability of any common law constitutional
system very much depends on the authority and willingness of its final
court of appeal to revisit established doctrine when experience has
demonstrated that one of its earlier judgments is either being
misconstrued or was wrongly decided. This seems especially true in a
system such as ours in Canada where the Constitution is considered to
be a “living tree”.
Just as important, for reasons going to its institutional integrity, the
Court must proceed with great caution before substantially revamping
established precedent or taking the drastic step of overruling an earlier
judgment. If the Court appears too eager to revisit established
principles then the authority of its judgments will be undermined and
its institutional integrity will needlessly suffer. In other words, the
institutional integrity of the Court would seem to depend both on its
willingness to reconsider its past decisions when the reasons for doing
so are compelling and the resolve to refrain from doing so when they
are not.68

As Justice Patrick Healy has correctly pointed out, the ancillary
powers doctrine crept into our law like “something of a Trojan-horse for
the expansion of police powers”.69 As a result, the debate that has finally
broken out among the justices at the Supreme Court of Canada on its
continued use and utility is most welcome and long overdue.
In Kang-Brown, Bastarache J. clearly had no difficulty with the idea
of the Supreme Court taking the responsibility of filling gaps in police
powers. He was quite willing to grant the police this new power based on
little more than generalized suspicion. With his retirement, it remains to
be determined how his replacement, Cromwell J., might feel about the
place of the ancillary powers doctrine within our constitutional democracy.
It is Cromwell J. who would seem to hold the decisive vote on the future
of this controversial source of new police powers. Unfortunately, there

68
James Stribopoulos, “Has Everything Been Decided? Certainty, the Charter, and
Criminal Justice” (2006) 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 381, at 385.
69
Healy, supra, note 11.
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are no solid clues as to the position he might ultimately take on this
important constitutional question.70

V. CONCLUSION
One thing is certain, the Supreme Court of Canada will have plenty
of opportunities in the future to decide whether this doctrine should
continue as a part of our law or whether the cases that facilitated its
covert entry into our legal system should be overruled. This is because,
in the absence of a comprehensive code of criminal procedure in Canada,
which is unlikely as long as the Supreme Court is willing to fill the gaps
in police powers through its use of the ancillary powers doctrine, these
sorts of cases will increasingly become a routine part of the Court‟s
work.

70

During his tenure on the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal, Cromwell J. was never involved
in a case in which the ancillary powers doctrine was at issue.

